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Capacity  of  Local  Government  to
Provide  Services
Arlo Biere and John Sjo
Local  government,  the  core  of local  collective
action,  strengthens community  development  when
it can  initiate  and  carry  out local programs.  Local
government  is greatly influenced by its relationship
with other parts of the public sector.
This paper discusses  the role of local government
and  the  forces  working to alter  that role; presents
a  model  to  view  the  role  and  capacity  of local
government;  and  proposes  research  on  the  eco-
nomics  of local  government.
Role  of Local  Government
Since  the  Great  Depression,  local  government
has  increasingly  depended  on  the  federal  govern-
ment.  Citizen  demands  for  more  public  services
were  met  by new  federal  programs  and  by federal
grants  to local  and  state  governments.  Also, states
have  taken  over  programs  from local governments.
As  a  result  local  governments  lost  responsibility
in  determining  social  programs  but gained  respon-
sibility  for  providing  social  services.  In Kansas, for
example,  the state has completely  removed control
and  operation  of  social  welfare  from  the  county
government.  Sewage  and waste  disposal  standards
in  all  states  are  established  by  state  and  federal
agencies.  Cities and  counties  can  receive  state  and
federal  aid  to meet  disposal  requirements  through
cost  sharing grants.  Local public  health offices are
operated  by cities  and  counties  but are  supervised
by the state.
While  local  government  has  lost  to state  and
federal  agencies  authority  to  initiate  programs
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and  to  set  organizational  policies  and  standards,
it has gained responsibility  for executing  expanded
old  and  new  programs.  An  analysis  of  Gross Na-
tional  Product  (GNP)  shows  local  government
expenditures  are  increasing  relative  to  federal
expenditures.  Since  1955  local  government  pur-
chases  as  a percentage of GNP have doubled,  while
federal  purchases  as  a  percentage  of  GNP  have
declined.
The  future  role  of  local  governments  will  be
shaped  by  citizen  a)  concern  about  the  size  and
growth  of the  public sector, the growth of bureau-
cracies,  and  the  decline  of citizen  participation  in
public  decision  making;  b)  resistance  to  higher
taxes;  c)  demands  for more  public services; and d)
recognition  of the limits of government to produce.
The  financial  crisis  of  our  cities,  especially  New
York  City,  has  directed  attention  to  problems  of
local government.
The  public  sector has  grown  from  a minor to a
major  user  of our nation's  resources.  Government
purchases  of  goods  and  services  now  account  for
nearly  one-fourth  of  the  nation's  gross  national
product,  and  government  transfer  payments,
another  one-tenth. Increased population,  increased
external  costs associated with people and industries
concentrated  in  the  cities,  and  increased  citizen
demands  for more and better services  not provided
by  the  private  sector resulted  in increased  produc-
tion  of public services  and in substantial growth of
the public  sector.
When  public  sector  production  used  a  small
portion  of  the  GNP,  increasing  government  effi-
ciency  would  not  have  saved  many  resources  so
public  interest in productive  efficiency  of govern-
ment  was  not  great  or  intense.  With  the  public
sector  growing  more  rapidly  than  the  private
sector  the last two decades,  interest in government
efficiency  has  increased.  Because  government  is a
major  user  of  our  nation's  resources  today,  even
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small  improvements  in  productive  efficiency  will
result in  significant resource  savings.  Thus, interest
in  the  efficiency  of  government  today  is  greater
than in the past.
Public  bureaucracies  expanded  with the growth
of the public sector. Some citizens have rebelled.  To
them  bureaucracy  symbolizes  the  transfer  of
government  from the people  to bureaucrats.  Those
who  are  rebelling  think  that  bureaucrats  are  sub-
stituting  their  own  objectives,  desires,  and  aspira-
tions  for  those  of  the  people  [Nisbet].  They  be-
lieve  bureaucrats  resist  change  other than  growth
and  especially  resist  size  reductions  because  the
bureaucrats  are  trying  to keep their jobs,  the same
as  nongovernment  employees  do.  The  Colorado
Legislature  enacted  a  "Sunset  Bill"  in  response  to
that  belief.  The  bill established  a  maximum  fixed
life  for  all  state  programs.  To continue a program,
it  must  be  explicitly  renewed.  Similar  legislation
has been  introduced  in  other  state legislatures and
the  United  States Congress,  and  the idea is part of
the  1976 Democratic  party platform.
Citizens  are  seeking  a  voice  in  public  decision
making  through  court  action  opposing  decisions
of  public  agencies,  by  demanding  open  public
decision  making,  and  by  participating  in  public
hearings  and  deliberations  of  governing  bodies.
Citizens  have  effectively  prodded  along,  reversed,
or  stalled  environmental  programs  through  court
action.  "Sunshine  laws"  require  public  officials
to  open  meetings  to  the  public  and  to  provide
public  records of their actions.  That forces  public
officials  to  be prepared  to explain  and justify  their
decisions to the  public.
Citizens  are  simultaneously  resisting  tax
increases  and  asking  for  new  and  improved  pub-
lic  services.  School  bond  referendums  are  failing
with  increasing  frequency.  Kansas  law  limits  the
rate  total  ad  valorem  property  tax  revenues
may  increase  without  a  local  referendum.  Yet,
citizens  demand  better  schools,  better  law  en-
forcement, more day-care  centers,  and more public
housing.
To satisfy  those  competing objectives New York
City  has  obtained  revenues  for  new  programs  by
selling  bonds.  But  increasing  debt  to  finance  cur-
rent  expenses  only  delays  the  time  when  citizens
must  pay  for  the  expenditures-as  citizens  of
New  York  City  have  recently  discovered.  Public
agencies  can  fulfill  the  public's  competing  objec-
tives  only  by  obtaining  more  output  from present
resources.  The  pressure  to provide  public  services
more  efficiently  is  great  and  is  believed
by  some  to be the most acceptable  way to provide
new  and  improved  services.  The  Committee  on
Economic  Development  supported  that  belief  in
its recent report  [see  references].
The  criteria  for optimal  resource  allocation  are
the  same  in  the  public  as  in  the  private  sector.
However,  public  managers  have  been  unable  to
measure  the  quantity  and  the  value  of  public-
sector  output.  Both  measures  are  required  to
apply  accurately  the  criteria  for optimal  resource
use  and  to  compare  productive  efficiency  of
various  government  units  producing  the  same
service  or  product  or  to  compare  the  efficiency
of  public  and  private  organizations  producing  the
same  product.  Yet  resource  allocations  are  made
between  the  private  and  public  sector  and  among
public  uses.  We  need  to  find  ways  to  apply  the
optimizing  rule  or  to  develop  new  criteria  for
allocations.
All  needs  and  wants  of  the  public  cannot  be
met  with  our  limited  resources.  The  energy  crisis
alerted  the  public  to the  finiteness  of  our natural
resources.  That has been  reflected  in the comments
of  such  public  leaders  as  Governor  Brown  of
California  and  Senator  Hart  of  Colorado.  They
are  saying  because  the  world's  resources  are
limited,  we  cannot  satisfy  all  private  and  public
wants.  They  also  maintain  that  big  business  ex-
ploits  big  government  and  that  state  and  federal
grants  to  local  government  do  not  result  in  ef-
fective local operations.
The  size  and  growth  of  government,  citizen
attitudes  toward government  and its bureaucracies,
citizen  resistance  to  higher  taxes,  citizen  demand
for  public  service,  and  recognition  by some  of the
limits  of  government  are  influencing  the  roles  of
local,  state,  and  federal  governments.  Advocates
of new  federalism,  a move to redefine the  relation-
ships  among  levels  of  government,  envision  new
leadership  responsibilities  for  local  government.
At  the  same  time,  they would relieve local govern-
ments  of  programs  that  have  overriding  national
concern  such  as  social  welfare  and  income  re-
distribution.  Revenue  sharing  is  providing  new
revenues  to  local  governments  so  they  can  use
local  initiative  to  meet  some  citizen  demands.  A
basic  objective  of  the  new  federalism  is  to  find
how  government  can  be  more  effective  and
efficient.
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Model  for Studying  Capacity of Local Government
Our  framework  for analyzing  the  public sector
is analogous to welfare economics  as  applied to the
whole  economy.  We  use the  framework to analyze
efficiency  and  effectiveness  of  the  public  sector
and  of  individual  government  units.  Let  indivi-
dual  units  of government  in their executive  func-
tion  correspond  to the  individual  producers in the
welfare  economics  model.  The  resources  available
to  each  unit  are  its  physical  assets  plus  available
revenue  and  the  resources  purchased  with  that
revenue.  As  a  producer  of  public  services,  each
government  unit has a production function. Public
services  are  produced  to  satisfy  specific  public
objectives.  We  assume  that  each  legislative  body
has  an  objective  function  to  guide  it in  making
choices.  That  objective  function  corresponds  to
the  individual  consumer's  utility  function  in
welfare  economics. In  the welfare model, economic
goods  and  services  produced  provide.  utility  to
individuals  as they consume  the goods and services.
In  an  analogous  way,  public  services  attain  the
objectives  of  a  legislative  body.  Here,  the  social
welfare  function aggregates  the individual objective
functions  to produce  total  public  sector  effective-
ness.  Thus government  effectiveness  is obtained in
the same manner as economic  social welfare.
Applying  the  welfare  economics  model  to the
public sector helps to identify the  factors affecting
efficiency  and  effectiveness  and  to  recognize  the
information  needed  to  measure  efficiency  and
effectiveness  within  the  public  sector.  That helps
to  identify  the  role  and  capacity  of local  govern-
ment to produce  goods and services and to identify
research needed to help local governments.
Government  effectiveness  refers  to  the  level
public  choices  are  attained.  Measuring  effective-
ness  requires  weighting  each  individual  unit's
or  agency's  contribution  to  attaining  overall
objectives.  That  weighting  involves  value  judg-
ments  by  society  (social  choice),  so it cannot  be
objectively measured.
Besides  making  social  choices,  governments
develop production  and delivery systems to provide
the  goods  and  services  to fulfill  the  social  choices
made.  Frequently,  past  social  choices  were  made
anticipating  results  that did not materialize.  Either
the  program  proposed  action  that was  impossible
with  the  resources  available  or  the  government
unit  failed  to meet expectations.  In the  economics
of government  research, social choice has not been
effectively  separated from production and delivery
techniques.
Pareto optimum  in  welfare  economics  provides
for  suboptimization  of  social  welfare.  Pareto
optimum  provides  the  concept to isolate  objective
issues from social-choice  issues.  At Pareto optimum
it is not possible  to make anyone better off without
making  someone  else  worse  off.  That  is efficient
allocation  of  resources.  In  our  model  when it  is
not possible  to attain more  of any  objective with-
out  sacrificing  some  of  another,  government  is
operating efficiently  or  at a Pareto optimum. That
defines efficiency  more generally  than the common
notion  that  government  efficiency  is  synonymous
with reduced government  spending.
Our  approach  permits  us  to  analyze  the  ef-
ficiency  of a  unit  of a  given  government  and  the
efficiency  of transactions among government units.
It  also  permits  us  to  identify  more  clearly  the
massive  information  flows required  among govern-
ment units  to  attain overall  efficiency.  Efficiency
is  not an  end  in itself but an  aid  to attain chosen
ends.  Efficiency  concepts  help  to separate  govern-
ment social-choice  problems from production  and
delivery problems.
An  individual  government  unit  producing  a
given  service  is  efficient  when  the  ratio  of  the
marginal  physical  product  of  the  resource  to the
resource  price  equals the  same ratio  for any other
resource  used. Problems  in measuring both output
and  input in the public sector  make it difficult to
know  when  that  condition  is  met.  It  is  common
to  use  population-served  as  a  measure  of output.
Only  when  per capita  services  are  equal in quality
and  quantity  among  units will  "population"  be  a
valid proxy  for output.  Although the  true measure
of  the  value  of  public  services  is  consumer  satis-
faction,  it may be possible to develop intermediate
or proxy  measures  of value.  Price in  a competitive
economy  is  a measure  of value because it is a good
proxy for consumer satisfaction.
We  think  the  problem  of measuring  output  of
the  public  sector,  although  admittedly  difficult
is  not  impossible.  Outputs  can  be  classed  as
physical  goods  (water,  sewage  treatment),  or
standardized  services  (licenses  issued),  or  crea-
tive  services  (health  services,  law  enforcement).
A  physical  good  can  be  measured  using  the  ordi-
nary  system  of  weights  and  measures.  A  service
is not tangible  and cannot be described by physical
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weights  and  measures.  However, if a service  can  be
standarized,  then  it  can  be  measured  in  terms  of
some standard unit. For example, if issuing a license
provides  a  standard  service  to  all  recipients,  the
number  of  licenses  issued  can  be  made  as  a
measure  of  output.  The  most  difficult  output  to
measure  is  a  service  that  is  not  standardized.
Such  a  service  requires  creative  activities  by
public  employees  each  time  the  service  is  per-
formed,  and  each  performance  is  unique.  Some
services  that  are  now  standardized  and  thus mea-
surable  were  once  creative  services,  such as  build-
ing  inspection.  As  more  was  learned  about  the
service,  it was possible  and desirable  to standardize
the  service.  Services  are standardized  for  two rea-
sons.  First,  standardizing  a  service  is a prerequisite
to  standardize  producing  the  service  from  which
economies-of-scale  may  arise.  The  resulting  pro-
ductive  efficiency  may  also  improve  the  satis-
faction  of  those  receiving  the  service  if it reduces
waiting  time,  confusion,  and/or other  frustrations
associated  with receiving the  service. Standardizing
also  permits  the  service  to  be  measured  and  it
provides  the  user  with  a  guide  regarding  what  to
expect.  The  benefit  is  similar  to  benefits  from
grading  products  in  the  marketplace,  but  the
public  sector  has  shown  little  interest  in  grading
its  outputs.  An  example  of  measuring  quality  is
the  insurance  industry's  ratings  of  capabilities  of
city  fire  departments,  which are  used  to establish
local  fire  insurance  rates.  But  that quality  evalua-
tion of a  public service  is by the insurance industry,
not the public sector.
Information  on cost  to produce  public  services
provides  managers  a  basis  to  make  comparisons
both  over  time  and with  other  units  of  govern-
ment.  Such  information,  thus,  is  an  incentive  to
achieve  more  efficient production.  Fund  account-
ing,  used  in  the  public  sector  for  budget control,
yields  little or no useful information on production
costs.
Although measuring government  inputs presents
no  conceptual  problems,  present  measures  of
resources used in the public sector are not accurate.
Fund  accounting does not treat  the typical govern-
ment  unit  as  a  single  accounting  entity.  Rather  a
typical  government  unit  is  financed  through
several accounting entities, called funds, established
by  legislative  action.  A  typical  county  may  have,
for  example,  a  general  fund,  a  road  and  bridge
fund, and a mental health fund.
The  funds segregate  revenues  according  to use,
so  a  given  department  often  is  financed  from
several  different  funds because  it  performs  several
different  functions. Segregating resources  by funds
in  a  department  makes  accounting  difficult.  To
complicate  the problem,  more  than one fund may
be involved in financing one function. For example,
Kansas  counties  have  a  special  fund  to  finance
employer  contributions  to  social  security  and
another  special  fund  to  finance  employer  contri-
butions  to  retirement  benefits  of  all  county
employees,  regardless  of  sources  of their  salaries
or wages.
In fund accounting  all  expenditures  are treated
as  current  expenses.  When  a  fund purchases  capi-
tal  equipment,  the  equipment  is  not  entered  in
an asset account  of that fund. Rather it is recorded
in  a  general  fixed  asset account.  Thus,  except  for
enterprise  and  intragovernmental  service  funds
the  cost of capital services used to produce a public
service  is  not  included  as part  of the  cost  to pro-
duce  the service except in the year that new capital
equipment  was  purchased.  Using  that  accounting
procedure,  managers lack adequate  information to
make  optimum  resource  allocation  decisions.
Charging  full  cost  of  equipment  when  purchased
and  charging  no  cost  for  existing  equipment  dis-
torts  current  cost  estimates.  Likewise,  failing
to  recognize  deferred  costs  when  the  liability  is
incurred,  as  with  unfinanced  retirement  obli-
gations, obscures  the true cost of government.
A  measure  of  efficiency  is  the  quantity  of
resources  required  to  produce  a  unit  of  output.
Usually  the  efficiency  of  a  given  unit  of  govern-
ment  or  an  agency is  of most interest.  But  a unit
or  an  agency  likely  produces  a  number  of  dif-
ferent  services.  Either  the  overall  efficiency  of
the unit or  the efficiency  of producing each service
could  be  used  in  evaluating  a  unit  or  an  agency.
Overall  efficiency  requires aggregating the different
outputs  into  a  composite  output.  This is  not yet
conceptually  possible  because  we  have  no  system
of  weights  to  use  in aggregating  unlike  goods and
services  that  have  no  market  price.  Present
deficiencies  in  that  approach  are  most  vividly
seen  in  economies-of-scale  studies  of government.
Those  studies  correlate  per  capita  expenditure
(as  a  measure  of  unit  cost)  with  the  number  of
people  served  (as  a  measure  of  output)  [Alesch
and  Dougharty;  Sjo  et  al.].  Only  in  rare  cases  is
number  served  a  valid measure  of output. Evaluat-
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ing the  efficiency  of producing each good or service
does  not  require  aggregating  outputs,  but it does
require  allocating  costs  according  to  the  resources
used  to  produce  each  service.  That is difficult but
not impossible  except  in  cases  of truly joint pro-
duction.  It  appears  most  fruitful  to  study  effi-
ciency of public services at the most elemental  level
and  to  use  individual  production  efficiencies  to
evaluate  the  efficiency  of  an  agency  or  unit  of
government.
Government  units  give  little  attention  to  a
balance  sheet  for the  whole  unit. It  is  not natural
to  want  to  do  so  because  the  basic  accounting
entity  is  the  fund.  Also it is  felt that  because  the
primary  use  of  a  balance  sheet  is  to  measure
changes  in  net assets,  it has  no use  in  such  a  non-
profit  organization  as  a  government  unit. Yet, the
balance  sheet does provide  a useful record in meet-
ing long-term  obligations  and improves accounting
for changes in the values  of capital equipment.
For total public-sector  efficiency  it is necessary
to have efficient  resource  use  among  units  as  well
as  within  units of government.  Many  transactions
are  between  government  units,  e.g.,  grants, regula-
tions,  and contracts.  Do those  transactions and the
actions  of individual  units sum to an efficient  con-
dition?  In  a purely competitive  economy  the price
system  provides  the  organizing  mechanism  or  in-
formation  system  for  achieving  efficiency  among
government  units.  One  of  the  tasks  of the  public
bureaucracy  is  to provide such  an information sys-
tem. Many  of the problems in bureaucracies  center
in  their  information  processing  systems.  Different
government  structures  most  likely  require  dif-
ferent  information  systems.  It  is  argued  that  the
"new  federalism"  would  greatly  reduce  the  mas-
siveness  of the  present  information  system.  Is  it
possible  to  reorganize  government  to  reduce  the
amount  of  information  processing  required?  Cost
and  quality  of  alternative  information  process-
ing  systems  is  a  fruitful  area  to study.  Sometimes
pseudo price  mechanisms  may be used to augment
the information system for the  public sector.
Among  information  transferred  between  units
of  government  is  the  cost  to  perform  specific
services.  As previously  shown  government account-
ing  procedures  do  not  measure  the  true  cost  of
resources  used  to  produce  a  service.  Transmitting
present cost  information would  be misleading  and
could  lead  to  inefficient  production  of  public
services.
Accounting  is  a  strong  organizing  concept  and
its  impact  on  the  structure  of the  public  sector
can  be  easily  underestimated.  Present  accounting
procedures  do not discourage proliferation  of local
government  units.  Because  a  county is not a single
financial  entity  but  a conglomeration  of financial
entities,  called  funds,  there  is  little  to  restrain
forming  new  special districts. Then a new account-
ing entity likely  will  be  formed whether  the  func-
tion  is  provided  by  the  county  or  by  a  special
district.
Externalities and Efficiency
Even  when  individual  government  units  ac-
curately  measure cost and value  of outputs and are
organized  to  produce efficiently,  individually,  the
total  public  sector  may  not  be  efficient.  Ineffi-
ciency  in  the  combined  sum  of  efficient  units
results  from  conflicting objectives  among the units
and  from benefits and costs  of individual programs
and  functions  extending  beyond  the  unit's  juris-
diction.  Failing  to recognize  and to transmit those
externalities  to  the  individual  government  unit
leaves  an  incomplete  information  system  that  is
inadequate  to  formulate  individual  unit  goals  or
to make decisions consistent with total government
goals. In some instances  the problem is solved when
an  externality  is  internalized  by  moving  the  pro-
gram  to  a  higher government  unit  where  all  costs
and  benefits  are  internal to the  larger jurisdiction.
Externalities  in  both  producing  public  services
and  in  satisfying  public  objectives  are  similar  to
externalities  of  production  and  consumption  in
the  private  sector.  Fire  protection,  community
parks,  and  libraries  have  few  production  extern-
alities.  Education  has  externalities  because  many
people  are living and working in a community  other
than  the  one  that  educated  them.  Government
rules on property rights and on commerce have im-
plications  far  beyond  a  single  community. Extern-
alities  in law enforcement  result from investigation
and  apprehension  going  beyond  the jurisdictional
boundaries  of any one police department.  The cost
to provide  a service  to another jurisdiction,  for ex-
ample  apprehending  another jurisdiction's escaped
prisoner,  is  another  type  of externality. Externali-
ties  can  be  either positive  or negative.  A negative
one  (cost)  would  result from a local health depart-
ment  failing  to  enforce  a  stream  quality-control
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regulation  so  polluted  water  flows  into  the  next
jurisdiction.
Externalities  exist  in  satisfying  objectives  when
the  level  of  attainment  of  an  objective  in  one
community  influences satisfaction  in another com-
munity.  Recent  American  history  shows  that
citizen  concern  for  equal  rights  extends  beyond
one's own  community.  The  same  is true for social
welfare  and  public  health.  The  approach  in equal
rights  has  been  to  eliminate  the  externality  by
moving  the  issue  to  the  federal  level.  Social  wel-
fare  remains  a  state  and  local  obligation  even
though  it  is  recognized  that  costs  and  benefits  of
such  a  program  transcend  state  and  local  bound-
aries.  Serious  national  health hazards  such  as  this
year's  vaccination  program  against  swine  flu  and
past  eradication  of cholera  and  other  dreaded  dis-
eases  have been  co-ordinated  at the  national level.
Coping  with  such  externalities  is  one  of  the
challenges  of any public-sector information system.
Research  Opportunities  in Local Government
We  have attempted  to analyze  the  role and the
capacity  of  local  government  as  a  component  of
the  public  sector.  We  found  these  research  oppor-
tunities  in  local  government  structure  and  opera-
tion:  descriptive  analyses  of  local  government
structures  and  operations;  restructuring  manage-
ment  systems  for  local  governments;  refining
techniques  to  measure  output,  input,  and  ef-
ficiency;  analyzing  the  legal-economic  founda-
tions for local governments;  analyzing the  effect of
state  regulation on local governments; reorganizing
government  operations  and  structures;  and  deter-
mining  reasons  for and alternatives to proliferating
local government units.
Detailed  description  of  the  structure  and
operation  of  the  offices  and  departments  of
counties  and  cities is the  foundation to study local
government. Yet, such information is scarce. We did
such  a study of Ellis County,  Kansas, to obtain  the
institutional  information  required  to design  a new
financial  management  system  [Sjo  and  Biere].
County officers,  state officials, and state legislators
have  indicated  that  the  report  on  that  study has
aided their understanding  of county operations.
Although  financial  management  systems  have
been  designed  for  large  cities  and  counties,
moderate sized local governments have not received
equal attention. Furthermore,  present local govern-
ment,  financial-management  information  is
organized  primarily  to  provide  accountability.  It
could  also  feedback  to local  government  officials
on  performance  if  it  provided  accurate  cost
information.  Fund  accounting  founded  on  legal
requirements  rather  than  accounting  principles
is  not  well  suited  to  providing  that  information.
It  appears  that  a  two-part  accounting  system  is
necessary  to  provide  both  cost  information  and
statutory  information.  One  part  would  be  the
fund  accounts;  the  other,  function  or  activity
accounts.  The  complexity  of  a  dual  accounting
system would  necessitate  a computerized account-
ing  system,  so  the  complexity  would  be  in  the
software.  Then  operation  would  be  no more com-
plex  than  operating  the  present  fund  accounting
system.  We  are  taking  that  approach  in  design-
ing  a  new  financial  management  system  for  Ellis
County, Kansas.
Another  research  need  is  to  refine  the  techni-
ques  to  measure  output.  By  dividing  output into
its most elemental  forms  as  discussed  on page  67,
output can be measured  better. Improved measures
of output, along with  improved measures  of costs,
can be used more effectively  to measure efficiency.
The  state  constitution  and  the  statutes  of the
state  provide  the legal foundation for local  govern-
ments.  Local  governments  could  be more  efficient
and effective  if their officials accurately understood
the  opportunities  and  limitations  of local  govern-
ment. Many  states  have "home rule"  for cities and
for  counties.  Paragraphs  governing  local  govern-
ments  in  Kansas  (more  than  5000  paragraphs  in
Kansas  Statutes  Annotated  related  to  county
government)  are  widely  dispersed  throughout
Kansas  Statutes.  A  synopsis  of  those  paragraphs
would be useful to decision makers in Kansas.
Local  governments  are  also affected  by statute
interpretation  and  administrative  regulations  of
the  executive  branch  of  state  government.  What
is  the  nature  of those  regulations?  What  role  do
they  play  in  the  overall  information  system?
Vague, volatile, and conflicting regulations increase
uncertainty  for  local  decision  makers  and reduce
efficiency  and  effectiveness  of local  government.
Regulations  may  serve  purposes  other  than  ef-
ficiency,  for  example,  to constrain  social  choice
at the local level.
The  structure  of  institutions  in  the  private
sector  is  continually  modified  as  a  reaction  to
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changing  economic  forces,  but  the  structure  of
many  local  governments  is  fixed  by  statutes.  As
the  environment  for  an  institution  changes,  it
seems  likely  that  the  institution  will  also  need
to  change  to  cope  with  its  new  environment.
For example,  new technologies may provide organi-
zational  economies  when  offices  and  departments
that perform similar functions  are combined.
The  number  of  special  districts  continues  to
increase.  Why  are  we experiencing  such  a growth?
Will  that  growth  eventually  lead  to consolidation
as  we  experienced  with  schools? Studies of special
districts  and  reasons  they proliferated  would help
answer  those  questions.
In  summary,  we  identified  major  forces  in-
fluencing  local  government  today  and  developed
a  model  for  analyzing  those  forces.  From  the
analysis  we  propose  research  opportunities  to
increase the capacity of local government.
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